Effects of labour taxes on hours of market and home work: The role of international capital mobility and trade by HOON, Hian Teck
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics 
1-2014 
Effects of labour taxes on hours of market and home work: The 
role of international capital mobility and trade 
Hian Teck HOON 
Singapore Management University, hthoon@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons 
Citation 
HOON, Hian Teck. Effects of labour taxes on hours of market and home work: The role of international 
capital mobility and trade. (2014). Oxford Economic Papers. 66, (2), 516-532. Research Collection School 
Of Economics. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2337 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School 
Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For 
more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
Effects of labour taxes on hours of market
and home work: the role of international
capital mobility and trade
By Hian Teck Hoon
School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90, Stamford Road,
Singapore 178903; e-mail: hthoon@smu.edu.sg
The Prescott hypothesis that permanently higher marginal tax rates on labour income
fully explain the decline in market hours worked in Europe (relative to North America)
over three decades is subject to a theoretical investigation. The Prescott model consists
of isolated economies that are not linked by international capital mobility or interna-
tional exchange of goods. We study a two-country model with free international capital
mobility. We find that imposing higher marginal labour tax rates in one country leads
to international capital inflows into that country, which acts to counteract the negative
employment effect of higher taxes. Market hours worked in the low marginal labour
tax rate country fall with an increase in its net foreign assets. With identical prefer-
ences, total market hours worked are equalized across the two countries. With factor
price equalization, the international equalization of hours worked result still holds with
goods trade substituting for international capital mobility.
JEL classifications: E13, E22, E24, F11, F16, F21, H20.
1. Introduction
In an important paper, Prescott (2004) argued that the substantial decline in labour
supply of French, Germans, and Italians in the past three decades could be fully
explained by the increase in their effective marginal tax rates on labour. (Whereas
Europeans worked more hours for market pay than Americans in the 1970s, they
now work only about three-quarters as many hours as Americans.) That a rise in
labour taxes discourages labour supply in the short run is not controversial. Given
wealth, a reduction in the reward to work causes a substitution away from market
work. However, as the reduced take-home pay causes individual savings to also fall,
we would expect that over time the decline in wealth would counteract the sub-
stitution away from market work. Moreover, in the long term, the decline in wealth
in the region or country with the higher marginal tax rates on labour could cause
changes in the prices of domestic factors and goods, which would prompt inter-
national flows of goods and capital. The resulting cross-border flow of goods and
capital, in turn, would have consequences for employment in each economy.
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However, the Prescott argument that higher labour taxes in one region (Europe)
cause permanently fewer market hours worked there is made in a model with two
essentially isolated or autarkic economies that are not linked by international
capital mobility or international exchange of goods.
In this article, we examine the effects of higher marginal labour tax rates on
market and home work in a two-country world in which economies are linked
through the international capital market. We study in detail a one-good model in
which cross-border capital flows occur when the marginal tax rate on labour in one
country is raised relative to the marginal labour tax rate in the other country. As a
modelling strategy, Prescott (2004) adopted the Ramsey growth model to describe
each economy. The Ramsey growth model has the property that, in steady state, the
real interest rate is necessarily equal to the value of the time discount parameter.
One consequence of this is that, in a multi-country world with free international
capital mobility that is populated by representative infinitely lived Ramsey-type
individuals, the long-run global distribution of wealth is indeterminate.
Moreover, in such a world, if the rate of time preference differs across countries,
the one with the lowest rate of time preference eventually comes to own the whole
world’s outside wealth (Obstfeld, 1990). Since the long-run global distribution of
wealth is a key equilibrating mechanism through which the imposition of higher
marginal labour tax rates in one country brings about an adjustment of labour
supply in the rest of the world when economies are integrated through the inter-
national capital market, we need a model set-up that makes each country’s wealth
level a determinate variable in the long run. To this end, we adopt the overlapping
generations model introduced by Blanchard (1985) in place of the Ramsey growth
model to characterize each economy.1
With our modelling strategy, the question that naturally arises is: Does the
Prescott (2004) result, namely, that differences in marginal labour tax rates
across autarkic economies lead to long-run differences in market hours worked,
still hold with the choice of an overlapping generations model in place of the
Ramsey growth model? We show that the answer is in the affirmative so that the
crucial result of the article—that market hours worked are equalized despite
unequal marginal labour tax rates in the long run—is not a consequence of this
particular modelling strategy. Instead, what overturns the Prescott (2004) result is
departure from the assumption that countries or regions are not linked by inter-
national capital mobility or international exchange of goods. To highlight the role
played by international capital mobility, we set up the model in such a way that, in
the absence of unequal marginal labour tax rates, both countries are ex ante
identical. However, when the marginal labour tax rates across the two countries
are unequal, incentives are created for international capital flows despite identical
time discount rates and preferences. With an overlapping generations model to
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 The model of unconnected families of infinitely lived agents introduced by Weil (1989), and adopted
by Obstfeld (1989) in the context of a global economy exhibiting free international capital mobility, also
makes the long-run global distribution of wealth determinate.
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describe each economy, the real interest rate in the integrated global economy
differs from the time discount parameter in the long run and the resulting levels
of net indebtedness of each country can be uniquely determined. We find that, in a
two-country world with identical discount rates and preferences, the increase in
marginal labour tax rates in one country (with tax revenue being used to finance
government purchases) leads to a higher autarkic interest rate as residents in that
country decumulate wealth by more than their aggregate hours fall. As a result,
there is an incentive for capital outflow from the low marginal labour tax rate
country until there is an equalization of the national interest rates. In effect,
capital flows out of the low-labour-tax-rate country to work with labour in the
high-labour-tax-rate country thus pulling up labour demand and counteracting the
tax-induced disincentive to work in the latter. With capital flowing out of the low-
labour-tax-rate country, labour demand declines there and labour supply also
contracts as wealth is increased with an increase in the stock holdings of net
foreign assets. We find that in the long run, with identical tastes and preferences,
there is an equalization of the market and home work across the two countries.
In a multi-good, two-country world, if the factor price equalization theorem
(Samuelson, 1949) holds, the international equalization of hours worked result
still holds with goods trade now substituting for international capital mobility.
With wealth decumulation, the country that imposes a permanently higher
marginal tax rate on labour ends up with a lower autarkic long-run capital-
labour ratio. Under free trade, the high-labour-tax-rate country ends up as a net
exporter of the relatively labour-intensive good a` la Heckscher-Ohlin; the corres-
ponding increase in labour demand there acts to counteract the tax-induced
disincentive to work. On the other hand, the low-labour-tax-rate country
becomes a net exporter of the relatively capital-intensive good; the corresponding
decrease in labour demand there ends up decreasing employment. With
unhindered international exchange of goods, there is an equalization of goods
prices and real interest rates as well as of hours of market and home work across
the two countries. Thus, we find that once international capital mobility or inter-
national exchange of goods is taken into account, the effect of an increase in the
marginal tax rate on labour in one country is absorbed across both countries. In
other words, the domestic labour supply response to any increase in the marginal
tax rate on labour would be moderated either through international capital flows or
through trade in goods if factor price equalization holds. Since the result of inter-
national equalization of market hours worked through trade in goods follows
rather straightforwardly from the result obtained with free international capital
mobility, we omit the formal analysis.2
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some
related literature. In Section 3, we set up the household side of the model at both
the individual and aggregate levels. Section 4 asks whether the Prescott (2004) result
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 The interested reader is referred to the online Appendix for the details of the two-good model where
international factor price equalization holds.
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that different marginal labour tax rates across autarkic economies lead to long-run
differences in market hours worked still holds with the adoption of an overlapping
generations model in place of the Ramsey growth model. Section 5 presents the
two-country analysis with free international capital mobility. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
The role that wealth adjustment plays in determining aggregate employment when
marginal labour tax rates are increased was first explored by the present author in
the case of a small open economy and a single large economy in a conference paper
presented in 2006 and published in Hoon (2011). That paper, however, did not
conduct the full general-equilibrium analysis of the global economy where
countries are linked via international capital mobility. The current article is
intended to fill in this gap.
Blanchard (2004) asked how much of the decline in hours worked per full-time
worker in Europe over the past three decades is due to an interaction between
preferences and income growth on the one hand, and how much from increasing
tax distortions on the other hand. He concluded, ‘I read the evidence as suggesting
an effect of [effective marginal labour] taxes but with a large role left for prefer-
ences’ (Blanchard, 2004, p. 9). If we accept that the world economy of the past three
decades is better represented by a theoretical model exhibiting a high degree of
international capital mobility rather than one with no international capital flows,
the analysis would support giving different preferences between American and
European workers a greater role in explaining the different number of hours of
market work.
The theoretical finding that moving away from an assumption of zero to free
international capital mobility changes the effect of higher marginal labour tax rates
on aggregate employment calls to mind the Mundell-Fleming results of the effect-
iveness of fiscal policy when allowing for free international capital mobility. In
Mundell (1963), for example, with zero international capital mobility, a tax
increase, in contracting effective demand, shifts down the IS curve along an
unchanging LM curve thus contracting aggregate employment and lowering the
domestic interest rate. In a small open economy that takes the world interest rate as
given, and that operates under free international capital mobility and a flexible
exchange rate system, there is an incipient capital outflow from the tax-increasing
country, which leads to a real exchange rate depreciation. This boosts net exports
and returns the economy to its original employment level. Dornbusch (1980)
extends the analysis to a two-country world with free international capital
mobility. A tax increase in one of the countries, in contracting effective demand,
again contracts employment. However, the real exchange rate depreciation by the
tax-increasing country hurts the net export of the other country. The result is that
the burden of adjustment of aggregate employment is shared by both countries.
The weaker real exchange rate of the tax-increasing country, in boosting net
exports, partly offsets the contractionary fiscal shock while the other country’s
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employment is decreased as its export sector is hurt by a strengthening real
exchange rate brought about by an incipient capital inflow. The Mundell-
Fleming analysis is short-run and built on Keynesian assumptions whereas the
analysis here is long-run and built on neoclassical assumptions. Nevertheless,
both analyses examine the economic consequences for aggregate employment of
moving from zero to free international capital mobility.
A corollary result we obtain is that labour taxes, in affecting total labour supply
and domestic capital stock, are a source of comparative advantage. This result is
related to the trade literature that endogenizes the determinants of comparative
advantage. The classic paper by Findlay (1970) takes the national savings rate and
population growth rate as primitive determinants of long-run comparative
advantage. Matsuyama (1988) retains the Findlay (1970) production structure
but makes the national savings rate endogenous with intertemporal utility maxi-
mization for given preferences. Baxter (1992) also adopts intertemporal utility
maximization in a two-good model exhibiting Ricardian equivalence but with
fixed aggregate labour supply. Here we focus on the length of the workweek
(which is endogenous) as a basis for comparative advantage alongside the
endogenous supply of wealth in a model exhibiting non-Ricardian equivalence.
3. Individual behaviour and aggregation
Demographics are as described in Blanchard (1985). At any instant, a new cohort,
composed of many agents, is born, with its size normalized to . Because of
the large number of agents born in each cohort, each facing an instantaneous
probability of death  that is constant throughout life, the size of a cohort born
at time s as of time t is  expðtsÞ and the total population size at any time t isÐ t
1  exp
ðtsÞ ds ¼ 1.
We first focus on an individual’s choice of his time spent in market work, non-
market housework, and time for leisure.3 Building on Benhabib et al. (1991), we
suppose that the period individual utility function is given by
U ¼ log c^ þ A0 log½ L lm  ln þ B0, if lm > 0
¼ log c^ þ A0 log½ L lm  ln, if lm ¼ 0,
where A0,B 0 > 0, and c^  cmc1n , 0 <  < 1. Here, L is time endowment, lm is
time spent working in the market sector, ln is time spent in non-market housework,
cm is consumption of the market good, and cn is consumption of the home
produced non-market good. We assume that the non-market good is produced
according to cn ¼ snln; sn > 0: Notice that as in Benhabib et al. (1991), we suppose
that working in the market sector gives positive direct utility, presumably because
one enjoys certain social interactions and types of mental stimulation at the
workplace that one does not get by devoting all of one’s time to leisure and
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 Freeman and Schettkat (2005) and Rogerson (2008) emphasize the role of non-market work in
explaining the differences in market work between Europe and America.
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home work. We assume that there is a fixed positive utility value from working in
the market sector (given by B0) that is independent of the actual number of hours
worked. In contrast, the utility value derived from housework comes indirectly
from consuming the home-produced good generated by the time input into the
non-market sector.
To ensure that every living person in the economy spends a positive amount of
time working in the market to facilitate aggregation, we make the assumption that
the direct utility value from spending a positive amount of time in the market (B0)
is sufficiently large.
Assumption 1 B0 > 1ðA0þ1Þ½log L logð L 0þÞ:
Under Assumption 1, a very wealthy individual who might have chosen to retire in
a model without a positive utility value from market work spends a very small
positive amount of time working in the market (lm ¼ 0þ > 0) given the positive
utility value of market work compared to housework in our model.
The agent maximizesð1
t
flog½ðcmðs, ÞÞðcnðs, ÞÞ1 þ A0 log½ L lnðs, Þ  lmðs, Þ þ B0g expðþÞðtÞ d
subject to
cnðs, tÞ ¼ snlnðs, tÞ,
dwðs, tÞ
dt
¼ ½rðtÞ þ wðs, tÞ þ vhðtÞlmðs, tÞ  cmðs, tÞ,
and a transversality condition that prevents agents from going indefinitely into
debt. In the variable xðs, Þ, time s refers to the date an agent is born (that is, the
cohort by birth) and  refers to the current time that the variable is evaluated at. As
in Blanchard (1985), agents save or dissave by buying or selling actuarial bonds,
that is, bonds that are cancelled by death. Here,  is the subjective rate of time
discount,  is the constant instantaneous probability of death so 1 is the expected
remaining life, wðs, tÞ is non-human wealth at time t of an agent born at time s, and
vhðtÞ is after-tax wage rate.4 The rate of interest on actuarial bonds is rðtÞ þ .
From the optimal choice of cm, lm, and ln, we obtain, after some manipulation,
the following two relationships:
vh
cm
¼ A
0
L ln  lm
, ð1Þ
ð1  Þsn
cn
¼ A
0
L ln  lm
: ð2Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4 We assume that the take-home wage per hour worked in the market is independent of the age of the
agent.
h.t. hoon 521
Using (1) and (2) to get cn=cm ¼ ð1  Þsnð L lmÞððA0 þ ð1  ÞÞcmÞ1, and using
cn ¼ snln in (2) to obtain ln ¼ ð1  ÞðA0Þ1ð L ln  lmÞ, I can eliminate ln and cn
and write the individual’s intertemporal optimization problem simply as
Maximize
ð1
t
flog cmðs, Þ þ A log½ L lmðs, Þ þ Bg expðþÞðtÞ d
subject to
dwðs, tÞ
dt
¼ ½rðtÞ þ wðs, tÞ þ vhðtÞlmðs, tÞ  cmðs, tÞ, ð3Þ
where
A  1½A0 þ ð1  Þ,
B  1ð1  Þ log ð1  Þsn
A0 þ ð1  Þ
 
þ 1A0 log A
0
A0 þ ð1  Þ
 
:
The solution to the agent’s modified problem immediately above, having solved out
ln and cn, is given by
cmðs, tÞ ¼ ð þ Þ½hðs, tÞ þ wðs, tÞ, ð4Þ
L lmðs, tÞ
cmðs, tÞ ¼
A
vhðtÞ , ð5Þ
where human wealth is given by
hðs, tÞ ¼
ð1
t
½lmðs, ÞvhðÞ exp
Ð 
t
½rðÞþd
d: ð6Þ
Aggregate consumption is obtained by aggregating (3), (4), and (6) over
all agents alive at time t. Denoting aggregate variables with uppercase letters, we
obtain
CmðtÞ ¼ ð þ Þ½HðtÞ þWðtÞ, ð7Þ
_HðtÞ ¼ ðr þ ÞHðtÞ  vhðtÞLmðtÞ, ð8Þ
_WðtÞ ¼ rðtÞWðtÞ þ vhðtÞLmðtÞ  CmðtÞ, ð9Þ
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative and the aggregate variable
X(t) is defined as XðtÞ  Ð t1 xðs, tÞ expðtsÞ ds. Aggregating (5) over all agents
alive at time t, we obtain
ACmðtÞ
L LmðtÞ
¼ vhðtÞ: ð10Þ
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Moreover, using cn ¼ snln in (2), and aggregating over all agents alive at time t, we
obtain
LnðtÞ ¼ 1  
Aþ ð1  Þ
 
½ L LmðtÞ, ð11Þ
L LnðtÞ  LmðtÞ ¼ A
Aþ ð1  Þ
 
½ L LmðtÞ: ð12Þ
Once we have solved for the aggregate number of hours spent in market work,
LmðtÞ, eqs (11) and (12) give, respectively, the aggregate number of hours spent
in home work and leisure.
We note that although every worker faces the same hourly pay, the fact that the
members of the labour force are of different ages means that their wealth levels are
different, and consequently, the number of hours worked will be different across
the different age cohorts. In working with a model with overlapping generations as
described in Blanchard (1985), we face the possibility of some individuals who live
forever having a rising consumption profile over their lifetimes even when the
economy is in a steady state. Such individuals who live forever and become very
rich in this model will still spend a positive (though vanishingly small) amount of
time in market work given Assumption 1. This facilitates aggregation and preserves
the tractability of the Blanchardian model despite endogenizing the work-leisure
choice.
Taking the time derivative of (7), and using (8) and (9), we obtain
_Cm ¼ ð þ Þ½rW þ ðr þ ÞH  Cm: ð13Þ
Using (7) in (13), we obtain, after re-arrangement of terms,
_Cm
Cm
¼ ðr  Þ  ð þ ÞW
Cm
: ð14Þ
4. The Prescott long-run result under Ramsey and
overlapping generations
In this section, we examine whether the Prescott (2004) result that differences in
marginal labour tax rates across autarkic economies lead to long-run differences in
market hours worked still holds with the choice of an overlapping generations
model in place of the Ramsey growth model. Our presentation will make use of
a convenient feature of the Blanchard (1985) version of the overlapping generations
model where setting the parameter representing the probability of death, , to zero
(equivalently, setting the expected remaining life, 1, to infinity) gives us the
mathematical representation of the Ramsey growth model. We first describe the
production-side conditions. Then, we obtain the long-run general-equilibrium
autarkic solutions for the real interest rate and aggregate number of market
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hours worked using the overlapping generations model and compare with the
solutions using the Ramsey growth model.
There is a production technology for the output of the single Solow good (Y)
that is constant returns to scale in labour (Lm) and capital (K). Following Prescott
(2004), we let the production function be Cobb-Douglas so y ¼ k; 0 <  < 1,
where k  K=Lm is the capital-labour ratio. Under perfect competition, the optimal
choice of capital and labour by price-taking firms gives
r ¼ kð1Þ, ð15Þ
vf ¼ ð1  Þk, ð16Þ
where r is the real interest rate and vf is the gross hourly wage paid by the firm. The
latter is related to the after-tax hourly wage received by the worker, vh, by
vh  vf =ð1 þ Þ,  being the marginal tax rate on labour income. The total tax
revenue collected is vhLm, which we assume is used to finance government
purchases (G) so vhLm ¼ G.
Note from (10) that, defining ~Cm  Cm=vh, we can write ~Cm ¼  ðLmÞ;
 0ðLmÞ < 0. Noting that _~Cm ¼  0ðLmÞ _Lm, vh  vf =ð1 þ Þ, and using (14), we
obtain a dynamic equation showing the evolution of Lm:
 0ðLmÞ _Lm ¼ ðr  Þ ðLmÞ  ð þ Þð1 þ ÞW
vf
: ð17Þ
From (9), we obtain the following dynamic equation giving the evolution of wealth:
_W ¼ rW þ v
f
1 þ 
 
½Lm   ðLmÞ: ð18Þ
Using (15) and (16) and noting that in the autarkic economy, W  K , the
condition that _Lm ¼ 0 in (17) gives
r ¼ þ ð þ Þð1 þ Þ
1  

r
  Lm
 ðLmÞ , ð19Þ
whereas the condition that _W ¼ 0 in (18) gives

1  
h i
¼ 1
1 þ 
 
 ðLmÞ
Lm
 1
 
: ð20Þ
Substituting out for  ðLmÞ=Lm in (19) using (20), we obtain
r ¼ þ ð þ Þ
1  

r
  
1  þ
1
1 þ 
 1
: ð21Þ
To study the effect of raising the marginal tax rate on labour income in the
autarkic economy, we differentiate through (20) to obtain the following derivative,
noting that the result does not require that  be initially zero:
dLm
d
¼ 

1
 	
 ðLmÞ
L2m
  0ðLmÞLm
< 0:
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Hence, in the autarkic economy, raising the marginal tax rate on labour income
unambiguously reduces the long-run number of market hours worked. In the
overlapping generations model, raising the marginal tax rate on labour income,
however, also raises the real interest rate in the autarkic economy as differentiating
through (21) gives:
dr
d
¼
ðþÞ
1

r
 	

1þ 11þ
 2
ð1 þ Þ2
1 þ ðþÞ1 r2
 	

1þ 11þ
 1 > 0:
Comparing the results obtained here, where we have used the overlapping gen-
erations model to describe each autarkic economy, with the results where the
Ramsey growth model is used as in Prescott (2004) is now straightforward; we
simply have to examine (20) and (21). As noted at the beginning of this section,
setting the probability of death, , to zero gives the mathematical representation of
the Ramsey growth model. From (20), we note that the equation determining the
equilibrium number of hours of market work is independent of . Thus, with the
assumptions of logarithmic utility function and Cobb-Douglas neoclassical
production function made in Prescott (2004), replacing the Ramsey growth
model with the Blanchard (1985) version of the overlapping generations model
does not change the quantitative effect on total number of hours of market work of
raising the marginal tax rate on labour. From (21), however, with  set equal to
zero, we find that the autarkic real interest rate is equal to the rate of time
preference, . Thus, with the Ramsey growth model used to charaterize each
autarkic economy, raising the marginal tax rate on labour has no effect on the
real interest rate.
5. Allowing free international capital mobility
To build our economic intuition for the role played by free international
capital mobility in obtaining the result of international equalization of total
market hours worked despite different marginal tax rates on labour income
within the two-country world setting, which is the main contribution of this
article, it is helpful to start with the small open economy case. We present
the small open economy case in Section 5.1 and the two-country case in
Section 5.2.
5.1 Wealth adjustment in the small open economy
The small open economy takes the world interest rate, r, as parametrically
given. With the domestic interest rate being equal to the world interest rate, r,
the optimal capital-labour ratio is determined from (15): k ¼ ð=rÞ1=ð1Þ. The
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gross hourly wage is accordingly determined from (16): vf  ¼ ð1  Þð=rÞ=ð1Þ.
We set r ¼ r and vf ¼ vf  in (17) and (18) to obtain
 0ðLmÞ _Lm ¼ ðr  Þ ðLmÞ  ð þ Þð1 þ ÞW
vf 
, ð22Þ
_W ¼ rW þ v
f 
1 þ 
 
½Lm   ðLmÞ: ð23Þ
Under the assumption obtained in Blanchard (1985) giving saddle-path stability
in the case of the small open economy, which we call Assumption 2, we obtain a
system represented by (22) and (23) that is also saddle-path stable in the two
variables, Lm and W, the latter being a state variable:
Assumption 2 r < þ:
Figure 1 shows the dynamic properties of the system represented by (22) and (23)
given an initial W0. Suppose that the economy is initially in a steady state with a
positive value of . We wish to study how the economy’s total hours supplied to the
market and wealth will evolve in response to a sudden unanticipated permanent
increase in the marginal labour tax rate, , from its initial rate. We observe that, by
setting _Lm and _W , respectively, equal to zero, we obtain
ðr  Þ ðLmÞ ¼ ð þ Þ ð1 þ ÞW
vf 
 
, ð24Þ
rð1 þ ÞW
vf 
¼  ðLmÞ  Lm: ð25Þ
Inspecting (24) and (25), we see that an increase in  leads to an equiproportionate
decline in wealth that leaves ð1 þ ÞW and Lm invariant. Figure 2 shows the
dynamic adjustment path taken in response to the sudden permanent increase in
. At the initial wealth level, Lm drops the most in response to the higher marginal
labour tax rate. (We note from (11) and (12) that the reduction in market work is
compensated by proportionate increases in home work and leisure.) Gradually,
however, as savings become negative and wealth declines, the total number of
hours spent in market work increases (and home work and leisure decrease pro-
portionately). Finally, when wealth has fully adjusted, total hours allocated to
market work, home work, and leisure are all restored to their original levels
despite the higher marginal labour tax rate. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the small open economy taking the world interest rate as para-
metrically given, the marginal tax rate on labour income is neutral for market work,
home work, and leisure in the long run.
5.2 The two-country global economy
We consider two countries in the global economy, Country A and Country B,
which are initially in autarky and are isolated from each other but have equal
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marginal tax rates on labour income, A ¼ B > 0. Without loss of generality,
we now suppose that Country B’s marginal tax rate on labour income is raised
above the rate in Country A so that B > A > 0. From (20) and (21), we find that
in Country B (the high marginal labour tax rate country) the number of hours of
= 0 
= 0 
Fig. 1 Saddle-path stability.
= 0 
= 0 
Fig. 2 Private wealth decumulation in response to payroll taxes.
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market work (Lm) is lower and the domestic real interest rate (r) is higher
compared to Country A, that is, ðLBmÞautarky < ðLAmÞautarky and ðrBÞautarky > ðrAÞautarky .
Allowing for perfectly free international capital mobility, we have interest rate (r)
equalization and equalization of the gross hourly wage (vf) across countries. By
setting _Lim and _W
i, i ¼ A, B, respectively, equal to zero, we obtain
ðr  Þ ðLimÞ ¼ ð þ Þ
ð1 þ iÞWi
vf
 
, ð26Þ
rð1 þ iÞWi
vf
¼  ðLimÞ  Lim, ð27Þ
where B > A > 0. Using (27) to substitute out for ð1 þ iÞWi=vf in (26), we
obtain
ðr  Þr ¼ ð þ Þ 1  L
i
m
 ðLimÞ
 
: ð28Þ
Because the right-hand side of (28) is monotone decreasing in Lim, the equalization
of the real interest rate under perfect international capital mobility implies the
international equalization of hours worked, that is, LAm ¼ LBm even though the
marginal tax rate on labour income is higher in Country B.
Since ðLBmÞautarky < ðLAmÞautarky in autarky, we can have a better understanding of
the mechanism leading to the equalization of market work across the two countries
under perfect international capital mobility, ðLBmÞcapital mobility ¼ ðLAmÞcapital mobility, by
examining the net foreign asset position of each country. The countries start off in
autarky with Country B facing a higher domestic real interest rate as a result of the
higher marginal labour tax rate. Residents in Country A are then attracted by the
higher return to invest in Country B until the real interest rate is equalized across
the countries, that is, r ¼ ðkAÞð1Þ ¼ ðkBÞð1Þ, where kA  KA=LAm and
kB  KB=LBm. However, as LAm ¼ LBm under perfect international capital mobility,
we must have ðKAÞcapital mobility ¼ ðKBÞcapital mobility ¼ Kcapital mobility. Defining F > 0
as the size of net foreign assets of Country A (equivalently, net foreign liabilities
of Country B), the non-human wealth of residents in Country B is given by
WB  KB  F whilst the non-human wealth of residents in Country A is given
by WA  KA þ F.
How does one calculate the size of F? Note from (26) that because LAm ¼ LBm
and both countries face the same real interest rate (r) and gross hourly wage (vf),
we have ð1 þ BÞWB ¼ ð1 þ AÞWA. With B > A > 0, without loss of generality,
and KA ¼ KB ¼ K under perfect international capital mobility, we must have
ð1 þ BÞðK  FÞ ¼ ð1 þ AÞðK þ FÞ. Solving, we find that
F ¼ ~K
2 þ ~ ; ~ 
B  A
1 þ A : ð29Þ
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Thus we prove that Country B (with the higher marginal labour tax rate) ends up as
a net debtor and Country A becomes a net creditor. Using (29) and the definitions
of WA and WB, we can show that
WA ¼ 2ð1 þ ~Þ
2 þ ~
 
K, ð30Þ
WB ¼ 2
2 þ ~
 
K, ð31Þ
so, clearly, WA > WB, that is, residents in Country A become wealthier than
residents in Country B.
A question of interest is what happens to the number of hours of market work in
Country A as a result of the net capital flows that occur in response to the higher
marginal labour tax rate imposed in Country B? To get the answer, note from (20)
that, in autarky, the number of market hours worked in Country A is given by

1  
h i
¼ 1
1 þ A
 
 ððLAmÞautarkyÞ
ðLAmÞautarky
 1
" #
, ð32Þ
and (21) gives us the autarkic real interest rate:
ðrAÞautarky ¼ þ
ð þ Þ
1  

ðrAÞautarky
 !

1  þ
1
1 þ A
 1
: ð33Þ
With perfect international capital mobility so that rA ¼ rB ¼ r, using (30) in (26)
and (27), and making a substitution, gives
r ¼ þ ð þ Þ
1  
 

r
  
1  þ
2 þ ~
2ð1 þ BÞ
 1
, ð34Þ

1  
h i
¼ 2 þ ~
2ð1 þ BÞ
 
 ððLAmÞcapital mobilityÞ
ðLAmÞcapital mobility
 1
" #
: ð35Þ
Comparing (32) to (35) we find that, with ð2 þ A þ BÞ=½2ð1 þ BÞ < 1 because,
by assumption, B > A, we have ðLAmÞcapital mobility < ðLAmÞautarky, that is, wealth
accumulation through the generation of current account surpluses in
Country A in response to the higher real interest rate (caused, in turn, by the
higher marginal labour tax rate) offered by Country B leads to a decline in
the number of hours of market work in Country A compared to autarky.5
With capital flowing out of Country A, labour demand declines there and labour
supply also contracts as wealth is increased with an increase in the stock holdings
of net foreign assets.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
5 Note that ½2 þ ~=½2ð1 þ BÞ  ½2 þ A þ B=½2ð1 þ AÞð1 þ BÞ.
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Using (31) in (26) and (27) and making a substitution gives, with perfect inter-
national capital mobility so rA ¼ rB ¼ r, (34) and

1  
h i
¼ 2 þ ~
2ð1 þ BÞ
 
 ððLBmÞcapital mobilityÞ
ðLBmÞcapital mobility
 1
" #
: ð36Þ
Comparing (20) (applied to Country B in autarky with marginal labour tax rate
B > A > 0) to (36), and noting that ð2 þ A þ BÞ=½2ð1 þ AÞ > 1 because, by
assumption, B > A, we infer that ðLBmÞautarky with the imposition of a higher
marginal tax rate on labour income is less than ðLBmÞcapital mobility. Thus the possibility
of capital inflows increases the foreign indebtedness of residents in Country B,
which acts as a spur to the supply of market work. The capital inflow from
Country A also boosts labour demand, which counteracts the tax-induced disin-
centive to work in Country B. Although the imposition of higher marginal labour
tax rates in Country B leads to a decline in market work in Country B in autarky,
the possibility of running current account deficits leads to a decline in wealth that
partly acts to boost the supply of market work until the number of hours of market
work is equalized across the two countries. We can summarize the results in this
sub-section as follows:
Proposition 2 In a two-country world with both countries initially in autarky,
the imposition of higher marginal labour tax rates in one country leads that
country to have fewer hours of market work and higher autarkic real interest
rate in steady state. However, with the possibility of international capital
mobility, the country with the higher marginal labour tax rate ends up as a net
debtor as it attracts capital inflows and the country with the lower marginal labour
tax rate ends up as a net creditor. Market work, home work, and leisure end up
being equalized across the two countries in the long run with free international
capital mobility.
6. Conclusion
This article was motivated by the desire to evaluate the Prescott (2004) hypothesis
that permanently higher marginal labour tax rates fully explain the decline in
number of market hours worked in Europe (relative to North America) over
three decades. The Prescott (2004) model, however, considered two essentially
autarkic economies that are not linked by international capital mobility or inter-
national exchange of goods. As a modelling strategy, Prescott (2004) adopted the
Ramsey growth model to describe each economy. The Ramsey growth model has
the property that, in steady state, the real interest rate is necessarily equal to the
value of the time discount parameter. One consequence of this is that, in a multi-
country world with free international capital mobility populated by representative
infinitely lived Ramsey-type individuals, the long-run global distribution of wealth
is indeterminate.
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We adopt the overlapping generations model introduced by Blanchard (1985), in
place of the Ramsey growth model, to characterize each economy so that in a world
with free international capital mobility, the long-run global distribution of wealth is
determinate. We show that the crucial result of the article—that market hours
worked are equalized despite unequal marginal labour tax rates in the long
run—is not a consequence of replacing the Ramsey growth model with the
Blanchardian (1985) version of the overlapping generations model. Instead, what
overturns the Prescott (2004) result is our departure from making the assumption
that countries or regions are not linked by international capital mobility or inter-
national exchange of goods. We study a one-good model where, for simplicity,
there are no incentives for international capital flows with equal marginal labour
tax rates but the imposition of higher marginal labour tax rates in one country leads
to higher domestic real interest rate in that country. As a result, there are incentives
for international capital inflows into the country with the higher marginal labour
tax rate, thus boosting labour demand there and counteracting the disincentive
effect of higher labour taxes. The number of market hours worked in the country
with a lower marginal labour tax rate also declines as residents there become
wealthier with the increase in net foreign assets. With identical tastes and rate of
time discount across the two countries as Prescott (2004) assumed, we find that the
number of hours worked in the market, home work, and leisure are equalized
across the two countries. With factor price equalization, the international equal-
ization of hours worked result still holds with goods trade substituting for inter-
national capital mobility.
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